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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE IN ILLINOIS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
GERI J. YONOVER*

As predicted by the dissenting Illinois Supreme Court Justices in the
seminal cases fashioning the tort of retaliatory discharge,' the retaliatory
discharge remedy has been sought in a variety of situations, some far
beyond the original parameters of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. ,2 and
Palmateerv. InternationalHarvester Co. 3 Recent Illinois Supreme Court

and Appellate decisions, 4 as well as federal decisions, 5 have struggled to
fill in the contours of the tort of retaliatory discharge, with a variety of
results. This article will analyze those decisions in an effort to uncover a
common thread, if there is one, or, as is more likely, to draw a map
indicating the current boundaries of the "new" tort.
I.

BACKGROUND:

A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., where an at-will employee was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim against her employer. 6 The tort was crafted to limit an employer's
* B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; Law Clerk to the
Hon. Hubert L. Will (N.D. Ill.), 1983-1985; Associate, Sonnenschein Carlin Nath & Rosenthal,
Chicago, Illinois.
1. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. 74 Il. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (Underwood, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981) (Underwood, J., dissenting; Ryan, J., dissenting, joined by Moran, J.).
2. 74 Il.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
3. 85 IIl. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985); Wheeler v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill. 2d
1, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985);
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied sub nom
Prestress Engineering Corp. v. Gonzalez, 105 S. Ct. 3513, cert. denied, Sackett-Chicago, Inc. v.
Midgett, 106 S. Ct. 278 (1985); Darnell v. Impact Industries, Inc., 185 11. 2d 158, 473 N.E.2d 935
(1984); Cosentino v. Price, 136 Ill. App. 3d 490, 483 N.E.2d 297 (1st Dist. 1985); Cipov v. International Harvester Co., 134 Il. App. 3d 522, 481 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1985); Burgess v. Chicago SunTimes, 132 Ill. App. 3d 181, 476 N.E.2d 1284 (1st Dist. 1985).
5. Horton v. Miller Chemical Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1985) (district court should

have granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; while plaintiff may have
been discharged without just cause, an employer is not liable in tort for discharging an at-will employee because it erroneously believes that the employee is permanently disabled).
6. 74 I11.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). Illinois is thus in the clear majority of jurisdictions
which place limits on the otherwise absolute right of employers to discharge employees with or
without cause. See F. Strasser, Employment-at-will: The Death of a Doctrine, 8 Nat'l L.J. 1 (Jan. 20,
1986) (by the end of 1985, courts in 40 states had adopted some limitations to the doctrine of em-
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otherwise absolute power to terminate an at-will employee when that
right was exercised to prevent the employee from asserting his statutory
rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. 7 The Kelsay court reasoned that in the absence of a recovery in tort, an employee terminable at
will has no recourse against his employer if the employer decides to discharge the employee for filing a workers' compensation claim. Under
these circumstances, the employee would be forced to choose between
continued employment and the workers' compensation legally due him
or her.

8

The Illinois Supreme Court further refined the tort of retaliatory
discharge in Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo.,9 in which the company terminated an employee for informing local law enforcement authorities of suspected criminal activities of his co-employee and for
agreeing, if requested, to assist in the investigation and trial of the coemployee. In finding that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, the court held that the gist of the tort "lies in the protection of public policy, and there is a clear public policy favoring
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses."' 0
The Palmateer majority stressed that the cause of action for retaliatory discharge is allowed where "public policy is clear, but is denied
where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake."' 1 Recognizing that there is no precise definition of "public policy", the court
nevertheless stated that:
public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.
Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that
are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that
a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort will be allowed. 12
ployment at will). Note that this author misleadingly states that Illinois' exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is based on "implied contract." That statement was based on information
contained in H.H. Perritt, Employee DismissalLaw andPractice (1984 and Supp. 1985). Cf Dykstra
v. Crestwood Bank, 117 Ill. App. 3d 821, 454 N.E.2d 51 (1st Dist. 1983) (court refused to create an
exception sounding in contract to the general rule that an at-will employment is terminable at any
time for any or no cause. Such an exception would be broader than the exception created by the
Illinois Supreme Court when it recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge). See infra notes 88-100
and accompanying text.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138 et seq. (1983).
8. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
9. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
10. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
11. Id. at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
12. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (citation omitted).
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Since Kelsay and Palmateer,13 the elements of the tort of retaliatory
discharge consist of the following: (1) an employer discharged the plaintiff-employee in retaliation for his "activities" (such as filing a workers'
compensation claim, or "whistle-blowing" on a co-employee); and
(2) that the "discharge be in contravention of a clearly mandated public
policy."' 14 This two-pronged test determines the viability of a retaliatory
discharge claim.
II.

RECENT DECISIONS

The question whether certain "activities" are protected by a "clearly
mandated public policy" has been answered by Illinois courts in a variety
of ways.
A.

Worker's Compensation Claims

Illinois courts have taken a broad view with respect to workers'
compensation claims in connection with retaliatory discharge. For instance, in Darnell v. Impact Industries,Inc., 15 the Illinois Supreme Court
extended Kelsay to embrace circumstances where a plaintiff had filed a
workers' compensation claim against a prior employer and was subsequently discharged by the current employer when it discovered that the
employee had filed the earlier claim. Impact Industries had argued, unsuccessfully, that plaintiff's discharge because of a claim against a prior
employer was not violative of a "clearly mandated public policy." The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that defendant's position "would
seriously undermine the comprehensive statutory scheme which provides
'for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees.' 116 Illinois
appellate court decisions, both before and after Darnell, evidence a similar tendency to afford the protections of the tort in cases involving work13. These cases and the issue of wrongful or retaliatory discharge have been the subject of much
legal commentary. See, e.g., Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at- Will
Rule: Illinois Creates an Amorphous Tort: Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co., 59 CH. KENT
L. REV. 247 (1982); Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola-A Remedy for the Abusively DischargedAt Will
Employee, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 563 (1979). See generally Hartsfield, Avoiding Wrongful Discharge
Claims, 31 PRAC. LAW. 13 (1985); Greenbaum, Toward A Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65 (1985); Ward, Three New Exceptions to the Employment At Will Doctrine, 60
WASH. L. REV. 209 (1984); Heying, Wrongful Termination: A New Common Law Remedy for Employees-At- Will?, 72 ILL. B.J. 584 (Jul. 1984); Steefel, At-Will Employment-ContractualLimitation of
an Employer's Right to Terminate: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 463
(1984); Ryan, The Status of Wrongful Dischargein Wisconsin, 56 Wis. B. BULL. 22 (Apr. 1983).
14. Burgess v. Chicago Sun-Times, 132 Ill. App. 3d 181, 184, 476 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (1st Dist.
1985) (quoting Palmateer, 85 Il1. 2d 124, 134, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1981)). See also Wheeler v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
15. 105 Ill. 2d 158, 473 N.E.2d 935 (1984).
16. Id. at 162, 473 N.E.2d at 937 (citations omitted) (citing Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 182, 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978)).
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ers' compensation claims. For example, in Wolcowicz v. Intercraft
Industries Corp.,'7 the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. The trial court had found that plaintiff's allegation, that he was
discharged for the purpose of preventing him from pursuing his rights
under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, was conclusory due to
the lack of facts showing that intent on the part of defendant. The trial
court, apparently, based its ruling on the timing of the complained-of
activities.
Wolcowicz had alleged that he suffered a work-related heart attack
on August 26, 1980, while working for defendant. He did not return to
work until November 17, 1980. On November 18, 1980, he allegedly fell
at work, injuring his back. Upon return to work on November 19, 1980,
he was told to sign a "severance agreement" which terminated his employment. Wolcowicz eventually filed a workers' compensation claim on
December 1, 1981, almost 13 months after his discharge. In his complaint, Wolcowicz claimed that he was discharged for the purpose of
preventing him from pursuing his rights under the Act.
Reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, taking as true
all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences which could be drawn
from the language of the complaint, the appellate court found that the
circumstances of the case were sufficient to show an improper intent on
the part of the defendant. The court found persuasive Wolcowicz's argument that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was stated "even
though he did not allege that he actually filed a workers' compensation
claim subsequent to being terminated. A reasonable reading of plaintiffs
complaint reveals the essence of his claim to be that he was discharged in
order to deter him from exercising his statutory rights under the Act."' 8
Central to this holding was the court's concern that "unscrupulous employers may intimidate employees to keep them from exercising their
rights under the Act."' 9
17. 133 Ill. App. 3d 157, 478 N.E.2d 1039 (1st Dist. 1985).
18. Id. at 161, 478 N.E.2d at 1041-42.
19. Id. at 162, 478 N.E.2d at 1042. Cf Colley v. Swift & Co., 129 Il1. App. 3d 812, 473 N.E.2d
364 (2d Dist. 1984) (plaintiff, covered by a collective bargaining agreement stated a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge when he was terminated during the pendency of a workers' compensation
claim and before a decision was issued by the Illinois Industrial Commission). But see Burgess v.
Chicago Sun-Times, 132 Ill. App. 3d 181, 476 N.E.2d 1284 (1st Dist. 1985) (a clearly mandated
public policy is not involved where there is no allegation that defendant was informed, or in any way
found out, that plaintiff was pursuing any remedy under the Act and that defendant discharged him
because of it); Pientka v. Bd. of Fire Commissioners of The North Main Fire Protection Dist., 125
Ill. App. 3d 124, 465 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1984) (record showed plaintiff was terminated for falsely
claiming injury while on duty; he was not discharged for exercising his right to file Workers' Compensation claim). It should be noted, as well, that an Illinois court has recently held that an action
by a discharged employee for retaliatory discharge, seeking compensatory and punitive damages,
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Similarly, in Beauvoir v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center,20 the appellate court adopted a broad view with respect to the
chronology of filings of workers' compensation claims. In Beauvoir,
plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his complaint and its refusal to allow him leave to amend the retaliatory discharge count of his
third amended complaint, contending that the trial court had abused its
discretion. The trial court had refused the post-judgment motion on the
grounds that an amendment could not bring the claim within the parameters of Kelsay. In his proposed amendment, plaintiff alleged that while
he was an at-will employee of the hospital he filed workers' compensation
claims and an alleged agent of the hospital warned him that if he continued to file such claims, he would be fired.
Considering the proposed amendment and the settlement agreement
subsequently entered into between Beauvoir and the hospital, the appellate court found that plaintiff began filing worker's compensation claims
in 1979 or 1980; subsequently the agent told him not to file more claims
while employed by the hospital; he was fired on July 16, 1981; and on
September 1, 1981, he entered into the settlement agreement. The appellate court concluded that the proposed amendment stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under Kelsay in that plaintiff stated facts
from which a court could conclude that he was fired because he filed
21
workers' compensation claims.
B.

PrivateHealth Insurance Claims

Such broad protections afforded those who are fired allegedly in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims or to deter the filing of
claims does not, however, extend to claims filed with private insurers. In
Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc.,22 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
discharge of an employee for filing a claim under defendant's group
health insurance plan does not violate a clearly mandated public policy.
In Price, plaintiff argued that employers commonly provide group health
insurance for employees and thus a great many Illinois workers have this
coverage. To show that his discharge violated clearly mandated public
policy, Price cited sections of the Illinois Insurance Code 23 regulating
health insurance. The Illinois Supreme Court squarely rejected this arpredicated upon filing a workers' compensation claim, survives the death of the discharged employee. Raisl v. Elwood Industries, Inc., 134 Ill. App. 3d 170, 479 N.E.2d 1106 (lst Dist. 1985).
20. 137 Ill. 3d 294, 484 N.E.2d 841 (1st Dist. 1985).
21. Id. at 303, 484 N.E.2d at 846.
22. 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985).
23. Id. at 67, 485 N.E.2d at 360 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 613 et. seq. (1981)).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

gument. It noted that the Code was designed to govern operations of
insurance companies, not insureds, and that the filing of a claim under an
insurance policy pursuant to an individual contract between the insurer
and the insured is a private, individual matter, "rather than one affecting
our society." The court concluded that "discharge of an employee for
filing a claim under a policy in which he is a beneficiary does not violate a
'24
clearly mandated public policy."
Justice Simon dissented. 25 He noted that public policy is implicated
as employers are encouraged to provide health insurance plans for their
employees so that in case of illness or injury those employees would not
become destitute or public charges. In fact, federal tax law provides employers with deductions as incentive if their group health policies coordinate with federal medical assistance, 2 6 as does the State of Illinois under
identical circumstances. 27 Justice Simon also found that Illinois public
policy assures that insureds receive, without delay or harassment, contracted for and relied upon benefits. 28 Contrary to the majority, Justice
Simon concluded, therefore, that "[t]he court should recognize plaintiff's
complaint, not to expand the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, but as a cause of action based on an unconscionable abuse of economic power in derogation of public policy.., the real essence and basis
' 29
of the tort of retaliatory discharge."
The holding of the Price majority is significant. It suggests that,
despite the Illinois Supreme Court's apparent willingness to focus on
"the protection of the lives and property of citizens," in connection with
the possible hazards of radioactive waste, 30 the court will also reject an
attempt to rely on a statute, not directly affecting the issue in the case, as
a "public policy" umbrella.
C

Other Matters of "Public Policy"

Despite the majority's somewhat narrow definition of public policy
in Price, in a case decided the same day the Illinois Supreme Court
showed some willingness to extend the public policy concept.
24. Id. at 69, 485 N.E.2d at 361.
25. Id. (Simon, J. dissenting).
26. Id. at 69-70, 485 N.E.2d at 361 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 162(i)(Supp. 1985); S. Rep. No. 139,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 496 (1981)).
27. Id. at 70, 485 N.E.2d at 362 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(e)(1)(1981)).
28. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983)) (recovery of legal fees and specified punitive damages where an insurer delays payment through "vexatious and unreasonable" means).
29. Id. at 71-72, 485 N.E.2d at 362.
30. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1985) (decided on the same day as Price). See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
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In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,31 the court considered
whether the tort of retaliatory discharge was available to plaintiff under
the following facts. Wheeler had been employed by Caterpillar since
1955. As of August, 1979, he was employed in the X-ray department as
a radiographer. Some months earlier, he was told by his supervisors that
Caterpillar was installing a unit, which Wheeler was expected to operate,
that utilized live radioactive cobalt. Wheeler repeatedly requested a
transfer out of the X-ray department, allegedly because the unit was not
properly operated, could cause serious and permanent injury, and a Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") investigation disclosed a number
of inadequacies and violations of published regulations. Caterpillar allegedly refused Wheeler's transfer request and, in retaliation for his refusal
to work with the unit, discharged him. He claimed that the discharge
contravened Illinois public policy and resulted from Caterpillar's violation of federally-mandated safety codes.
In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth
District appellate court, 32 after a careful and thorough review of the record, concluded that there was no indication that any NRC investigation
was contemplated nor pending on the date of Wheeler's discharge, nor
were any inadequacies of the unit of a life-threatening nature. 33 Thus, on
the date of plaintiff's discharge, "there was no hard evidence of unsafe
conditions, but rather only plaintiff's unilateral and subjective decision
that such conditions did exist."' 34 The appellate court concluded, therefore, that the "public policy" implicated in Palmateer,35 and later reconsidered by the First District appellate court in Petrik v. Monarch Printing
Corp.,36 was not to be found in this case.
The Illinois Supreme Court, either misreading or misconstruing the
record evidence, reversed. Considering sua sponte the issue of preemption of the cause of action by section 210 of the Energy Reorganization
Act, and finding none, the court rejected the chronological analysis of the
facts articulated by the appellate court. 37 Instead, the court found that
"[t]he legislation and the regulations declared public policy, and the
existence of that public policy did not depend upon whether plaintiff had
31. 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
32. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 123 Ill. App.3d 539, 462 N.E.2d 1262 (4th Dist. 1985),
rev'd, 108 Il1. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
33. Id. at 544-45, 462 N.E.2d at 1267.
34. Id. at 545, 462 N.E.2d at 1267.
35. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
36. 111 111. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1st Dist. 1982). For a discussion of the Petrik
decision, see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
37. 108 Ill. 2d 502, 506-09, 485 N.E.2d 372, 375-76 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982) (Energy
Reorganization Act)).
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communicated a complaint to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or
whether its investigation preceded or followed that complaint. '38 The
court reasoned that
'[t]here is no public policy more important or more fundamental than
the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of
citizens....' The protection of the lives and property of citizens from
the hazards of radioactive material is as important and fundamental as
protecting them from crimes of violence, and by the enactment of the
legislation cited, Congress has effectively declared a clearly mandated
public policy to that effect. We hold, therefore, that counts III and VI
stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for refusing to work
under conditions which contravened the clearly mandated
public pol39
icy, and the circuit court erred in dismissing them.
Justice Moran, joined by Justice Ryan, dissented, disagreeing with
the majority's conclusion that plaintiff's cause of action was not preempted by federal law and finding no justification for extending the tort
of retaliatory discharge to cases where existing remedies adequately protect both the individual interest in employment and the public's interest
in safety. 4° Justice Moran found persuasive the fact that section 210 of
the Energy Reorganization Act provides extensive remedies, not shown
to be inadequate, for employees who believe they have been discharged or
discriminated against in violation of the Act. 4 1 Thus, even if the majority
correctly found that plaintiff's action was not preempted by federal law,
Justice Moran believed it inappropriate for the court to "intrude into an
'4 2
area already regulated by a comprehensive Federal statute.
A broad view of public policy similar to that taken by the majority
in Wheeler can be found in Petrik v. Monarch PrintingCorp.43 Petrik was
an appellate court decision which preceded Wheeler, and was the first
post-Palmateercase to address squarely the "public policy" issue. In Petrik, the appellate court concluded that Palmateer was not limited to
cases where criminal conduct was actually reported to outside law enforcement authorities. Rather, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
can be brought by an employee who has been discharged for complaining
internally of wrongs and possibly criminal conduct which are not viola38. Id. at 510, 485 N.E.2d at 376.
39. Id. at 511, 485 N.E.2d at 377 (citation omitted) (quoting Palmateer,85 I11.
2d 124, 132, 421
N.E.2d 876, 879).
40. Id. at 512, 485 N.E.2d at 377 (Moran, Ryan, J.J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 512-14, 485 N.E.2d at 377-78 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851(a), 5851(b)(1), 5851(b)(2)(B)
(1982)).
42. Id. at 518, 485 N.E.2d at 380.
43. 111 111.App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1st Dist. 1982). See generally Platt, Toward a Proper
View of the Retaliatory Discharge Tort, 72 ILL. B.J. 20 (Sept. 1983).
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tions of the criminal law, but which are nonetheless violations of public
policy.
In Petrik, plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged from his position as vice president in retaliation for his reporting suspicions of embezzlement to Monarch's president and to its chief operating officer and that
Monarch officers and/or employees "might be involved in violation of
the criminal laws of Illinois." The trial court granted Monarch's motion
to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend, ruling that since Petrik did
not allege that he had disclosed his suspicions of wrong-doing to the public authorities, his complaint merely alleged an internal corporation dispute which did not involve violations of public policy. This view was
squarely rejected by the appellate court.
Subsequent to the dismissal, the parties stipulated that Petrik did
not report his discovery of alleged wrongdoing to the police or to any
other law enforcement officials; that no criminal or quasi-criminal investigation was ever conducted as a result of any of the alleged wrongdoings;
and that, to the best of his knowledge; Petrik was never a party to a
criminal or quasi-criminal investigation of the matters alleged. 44 Based
on this stipulation, the trial court dismissed with prejudice Petrik's
complaint.
On appeal, the First District found incorrect Monarch's characterization of the facts as involving a mere internal dispute. Although recognizing that "there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that
are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, ' 45 the
court found persuasive, and consistent with the national trend, a Connecticut Supreme Court decision holding that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge had been stated where plaintiff, the quality control
director of defendant corporation, alleged that he had been discharged
for calling to his employer's attention repeated violations of the Connect46
icut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Wheeler and Petrik, taken together, portend failure of possible motions to dismiss retaliatory discharge complaints which are based on internal criticism or information allegedly given to appropriate authorities.
Given the broad view of these cases toward public policy, it would be
easy for plaintiffs to argue successfully that a refusal to falsify reports
directly affects the safety and well-being (Wheeler) of Illinois citizens and
44. 111 Ill.
App. 3d at 504, 444 N.E.2d at 590.
45. Id. at 507, 444 N.E.2d at 592 (quoting Palmateer, 85 Il1. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1981)).
46. Id. at 508-09, 444 N.E.2d at 592-93 (citing Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)).
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that a failure to report the alleged misconduct to public law enforcement
officials (Petrik) does not necessarily affect the sufficiency of a complaint.
This is not to suggest, however, that the mere use of the "magic
word"-"public policy"-is sufficient to state a cause of action, as the
Price case indicates.4 7 For example, in May of this year, the Illinois
Supreme Court again enunciated the limits of the tort of retaliatory discharge. In Barr v. Kelso-Burnette Co.,48 the court declined to extend the
clear mandate of public policy to allegations that defendant discharged
plaintiffs in retaliation for exercise of their rights of free speech, due process, equal protection, and privacy, among others.
The Barr plaintiffs were employed by defendants as foremen at the
construction of the Clinton nuclear power plant. They alleged that they
were discharged in violation of constitutional and statutory rights. The
trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, but certified the questions for interlocutory appeal. The
appellate court denied the petition for interlocutory appeal, 49 and the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.50
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a valid retaliatory discharge cause of action. Reasoning that the constitutional and statutory
provisions upon which plaintiffs relied were limitations only on the
power of government, not private employers, a point which plaintiffs
conceded, the court concluded that "[tihere is nothing in either the Illinois Constitution or the Illinois Human Rights Act to mandate the inclusion of the right of free speech [speaking out against layoff procedures]
into those rights which are applicable to the employer-employee relationship."5 1 Although plaintiffs contended that the relevant constitutional
and statutory provisions were "indicators of public policy" and a violation of them by anyone is a violation of public policy, the court
52
disagreed.
In reaching its conclusion, the court cautioned against too broad a
reading of the tort of retaliatory discharge, Justice Ryan stated:
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, however, this court has not, by its
Palmateer and Kelsay decisions, "rejected a narrow interpretation of
the retaliatory discharge tort" and does not "strongly support" the expansion of the tort. The common law doctrine that an employer may
discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason is still
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

For a discussion of the Price decision, see supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
106 Ill.
2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).
Id. at 524, 478 N.E.2d at 1355.
Id.
Id. at 528, 478 N.E.2d at 1357.
Id.
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the law in Illinois, except
for when the discharge violated a clearly
53
mandated public policy.
The Illinois Supreme Court again declined to expand the notion of
"public policy" to all situations where a plaintiff can allege that a statute
supports his cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 54 In Mein v. Masonite Corp., plaintiff claimed that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of Illinois public policy prohibiting age discrimination in the
workplace. 5 5 The court held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action for wrongful discharge as the legislature intended the Illinois
Human Rights Act to be the exclusive source for redress of alleged
56
violations.
In many respects, it is difficult to reconcile the rationale of Mein
with the more expansive holding in Wheeler, 57 decided merely one
month later. In fact, although Mein is cited neither by the majority nor
dissent in Wheeler, its reasoning could have easily worked into Justice
Moran's dissent which stresses not only the preemption of a federal statute, but also the adequacies of its remedy. 58
Appellate courts evidence similar reluctance to extend the tort far
beyond the Kelsay/Palmateerparameters. For instance, a complaint alleging that an at-will employee was terminated for failure to take a polygraph examination during the course of his at-will employment does not
state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 59 The court rejected
plaintiff's assertion that polygraph examinations are inherently unreliable
and that there is a clearly mandated public policy against their use in the
employment setting. 60 Similarly, discharge of an at-will employee for
53. Id. at 525, 478 N.E.2d at 1356 (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d
124, 421
54.
55.
56.

N.E.2d 875 (1981)).
Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985).
Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-101 et seq. (1983).
Mein, 109 Ill. 2d at 7, 485 N.E.2d at 315 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-111 (D) (1983)

(Illinois Human Rights Act)). It should be noted, additionally, that plaintiff's complaint was pending before the Human Rights Commission at the time of oral argument before the court. The Illinois
Human Rights Act provides in relevant part: "(D) Limitation. Except as otherwise provided by
law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation
other than as set forth in this Act." See also Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill.2d 1, 359 N.E.2d
473 (1976) (an employee cannot maintain an action for retaliatory discharge for termination in violation of the public policy set forth in the Age Discrimination Act). Teal held that the Act did not
authorize a civil action for damages.
57. For a discussion of the Wheeler decision, see supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
58.
59.

108 Il1. 2d 502, 511, 485 N.E.2d 372, 378 (1985) (Moran, J., dissenting).
Cipov v. International Harvester Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 522, 481 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1985).

60. Id. at 524-25, 481 N.E.2d at 23-24. Plaintiff relied, unsuccessfully, on Kaske v. City of
Rockford, 96 Ill. 2d 298, 450 N.E.2d 314, cert. denied sum nom City of Rockford v. Kaske, 464 U.S.

960 (1983). Kaske involved a public employee's (police officer) refusal to take a polygraph exam.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that because polygraph examinations are too unreliable to be used
as substantive evidence, the refusal to submit to one cannot serve as a basis of a finding of legitimate

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

failure to report to work or for seeking and receiving medical treatment
necessitating absence from work does not support an action for retaliatory discharge. 6' Stressing that an action for retaliatory discharge is not
allowed where it is clear that only private interests are at stake, 62 the
court found illustrative Palmateer's discussion of cases in other
jurisdictions:
The action has not been allowed where the worker was discharged
in a dispute over a company's internal management system, where the
worker took too much sick leave, where the worker tried to examine
the company's books in his capacity as a shareholder, where the
worker impugned the company's integrity, where the worker refused
to be examined by a psychological-stress evaluator, where the worker
was attending night school, 63
or where the worker improperly used the
employer's Christmas fund.
Private, not public, interests are similarly implicated where a newspaper delivery driver, covered by a collective bargaining agreement, 64 requests reassignment to an allegedly less "dangerous" route and is
denied. 65 The record there revealed that plaintiff chose not to return to
work on the same route, claiming he suffered from stress and anxiety.
When he refused to return to the assigned route, he was discharged. The
court found that such a discharge does not ground the tort of retaliatory
discharge, as "plaintiff was not asked to do anything illegal or improper"
or "asked to engage in any activities that were in contravention of a
clearly mandated public policy."'66 Similarly, where defendant contests
plaintiff's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and thereafter discharges plaintiff over the disputed contractual claim, the underlying controversy is a private contractual dispute; plaintiff's discharge is
not in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. 67 Where plaintiff sought to have liability imposed because defendant lied about the reason for her termination, the court held that an employer's lying to an
employee, both personally and through its internal records, is not against
cause as a basis for properly discharging a public employee. The Cipov court stressed the private/
public distinction and refused to extend Kaske to private employees.
61. Thomas v. Zamberletti, 134 Ill. App. 3d 387, 480 N.E.2d 869 (4th Dist. 1985).
62. Id. at 391, 480 N.E.2d at 872.
63. Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981) (citations omitted).
64. For a discussion of the employment status of plaintiff as triggering the protections of the
tort, see infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
65. Burgess v. Chicago Sun-Times, 132 Ill.
App. 3d 181, 476 N.E.2d 1284 (1st Dist. 1985).
66. Id. at 185, 476 N.E.2d at 1288. Cf Scheller v. Health Care Service Corp., 138 Il.App. 3d
219, 485 N.E.2d 26 (4th Dist. 1985) (despite defendant's alleged instructions to plaintiff not to respond to direct inquiries from Illinois officials concerning defendant, plaintiff failed to state a claim
for retaliatory discharge; she did not allege "discharge," but "was forced to resign from her job," nor
did she allege any retaliatory conduct on defendant's part).
67. Cosentino v. Price, 136 Ill.
App. 3d 490, 483 N.E.2d 297 (1st Dist. 1985). See also infra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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any clearly mandated public policy, but constitutes purely personal matters. 68 In addition, appellate courts have declined to find clearly mandated public policy in actions for retaliatory discharge based on statutes
69
which were repealed.
D.

Who is Protected by the Tort?

Until the 1984 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,70 the remedies afforded by the tort of retaliatory discharge were available only to at-will employees who were not covered by
a collective bargaining agreement. 7 1 In Midgett, however, the court
found that if there is no possibility that an employer is potentially liable
for punitive damages, a union employee has been given an incomplete
remedy and there is "no available sanction against a violator of an important policy of this State."'72 Further, the court reasoned that it would be
unfair to immunize from punitive damages an employer who unjustly
discharges a union employee, while providing the remedy of punitive
73
damages to a wrongfully terminated nonunion employee.
68. Powers v. Delnor Hospital, 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 481 N.E.2d 968 (2d Dist. 1985).
69. See, e.g., Dykstra v. Crestwood Bank, 117 Ill.
App. 3d 821, 454 N.E.2d 51 (1st Dist. 1983)
(to the extent the complaint relies upon public policy stated in the repealed Age Discrimination Act
in attempting to state a cause of action, it fails to allege a clear public policy). See also Cuerton v.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 111 111. App. 3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069 (2d Dist. 1982) (public policy is
not implicated in a retaliatory discharge action based on the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act which was repealed and replaced by the Illinois Human Rights Act which became effective over a year before the complaint was filed; neither party argued whether the complaint stated a
cause of action under the latter Act, nor did the court so consider).
70. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied sub nom Prestress Engineering Corp.
v. Gonzalez, 105 S.Ct. 3513 (1985). Midgett involved the consolidated appeals of that case, as well
as Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. In Midgett, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of
the action for failure to state a cause of action against the employer. 118 Ill. App. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d
1092 (1983). In Gonzalez, the appellate court affirmed the final court's dismissal of the complaints
for failure to state a cause of action. 118 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 470 N.E.2d 663 (1983).
71. See, e.g., Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983) (union employees under
collective bargaining agreements could not assert a claim for retaliatory discharge under Illinois
law); Mouser v. Granite City Steel Division of National Steel Corp., 121 Il. App. 3d 834, 460
N.E.2d 115 (5th Dist. 1984); Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d
203 (2d Dist. 1983).
72. Midgett, 105 Ill.2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. The decision has been criticized as an
unwarranted interference with the resolution of labor/management disputes regarding unjustified
employment dismissals. See Hyink & Liebman, Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.: The Short-Sighted
Use ofState Remedies to Protect Union Employees from Retaliatory Discharge, 18 J. MAR. L. REV.
565 (1985) (hereinafter cited as "Short-Sighted"). See also Richards & DeFranco, Retaliatory Discharge, 72 ILL. B.J. 480 (1984) (pre-dating Midgett); Silzer, Workers' Compensation: Retaliatory
Discharge of Employees Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70 ILL. B.J. 164 (1981).
73. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. The court also found support for its holding in other jurisdictions: Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Hawaii 1984); Peabody Galion v.
Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980);
Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980); Judson Steel
Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 22 Cal.3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250
(1978).
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Justice Moran, dissenting, argued that an employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, that requires just cause to be shown in
order to discharge a covered employee, is simply not faced with the same
dilemma as an at-will employee; for example, an employee's impermissible choice between seeking compensation under a Worker's Compensation Act or, in effect, sacrificing his or her job. 74 Given the plethora of
remedies and agencies available to union employees, such as collective
bargaining agreements, arbitration rulings, and decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board, Justice Moran's position is somewhat persuasive. 75 Nevertheless, in Illinois, union employees, as well as at-will employees, can now rely on the tort of retaliatory discharge, in addition to
whatever remedies are available under applicable collective bargaining
agreements.
Yet in spite of the broad holding in Midgett, at least one appellate
court has carved a niche whereby an employee covered by a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be easily assured of being able to state a
claim for retaliatory discharge. 76 In Cosentino v. Price, plaintiff alleged
that he had made certain claims pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement and that defendant threatened to discharge him and did thereafter discharge him. Noting that Illinois law recognizes a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge independent of any remedy the employee may
have based on a collective bargaining agreement, 7 7 the court nevertheless
held that the retaliatory discharge tort claimed by the plaintiff was based
upon rights pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; defendant
contested plaintiff's interpretation of the contract and thereafter plaintiff
was discharged over the "disputed contractual claim." As such, the "underlying controversy is a private contractual dispute" 78 and plaintiff
failed to show that his discharge was in contravention of a clearly man74. Midgett, 105 III. 2d at 155, 473 N.E.2d at 1285-86 (Moran, J., dissenting).
75. See Short-Sighted supra note 72. Cf Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, (1965)
(employee barred from suing his employer for severance pay because of employee's failure to follow
grievance procedures; cited by Moran, J., in Midgett, 105 Il.2d at 155, 473 N.E.2d at 1286).
76. Cosentino v. Price, 136 Il1. App. 3d 490, 483 N.E.2d 297 (1st Dist. 1985) (affirming trial
court's dismissal of complaint based on retaliatory discharge).
77. Id. at 494, 483 N.E.2d at 299 (citing Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984)).
78. Id. at 494, 483 N.E.2d at 300. Cf Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F.
Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. II1. 1985) (plaintiff's claim of retaliatory discharge, based on her filing of a

workers' compensation claim, is "inextricably intertwined" with a collective bargaining provision
prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge and, as such, is preempted by Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 185(a).) The Lingle court noted that Midgett did not address
the issue of preemption and therefore applied the standards announced in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,
105 S.Ct. 1904 (1985). See also Koehler v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., No. 60233 (III. Dec.
20, 1985) (the Railway Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982), preempts an action for retaliatory
discharge brought by an employee covered by the Act).
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dated public policy. 79

Cosentino threads the Midgett needle very

carefully.
An additional issue which may be presented, but which so far has
not been considered by Illinois courts, is the applicability of the tort of
retaliatory discharge to "employment" relationships other than individual at-will or union employees. For instance, can an independent contractor, manufacturers' sales representative, or franchisee avail itself of
the tort's remedies? It should be remembered that plaintiffs in both Kelsay and Palmateer were at-will employees who merited the remedies afforded by the judicially fashioned tort of retaliatory discharge due to
their unique relationship with their employers in the context of contemporary industry. As Justice Simon noted: "With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively
immobile workers who often have no other place to market their skills,
recognition that the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic." 80° That the Illinois Supreme Court has, over the strong
dissent of Justice Moran, recently extended coverage of the tort to union
employees who had not pursued contractual remedies under a collective
bargaining agreement, does not change the basic rationale noted in
Palmateer. In Midgett, the Court focused on the unfairness and unreasonableness of "immuniz[ing] from punitive damages an employer who
unjustly discharges an employee, while allowing the imposition of punitive damages against an employer who unfairly terminates a nonunion
employee."8 1 It is self-evident that most, indeed if not all, of the Illinois
cases concerning retaliatory discharge deal with plaintiffs who are employees.8 2 However, a court in another jurisdiction may furnish some
guidance as to the likely path Illinois courts will follow in dealing with,
for example, an independent contractor who alleges retaliatory discharge. A recent discussion by an Indiana Court of Appeals, in Morgan
Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, directly addresses the issue of the availability
to an independent contractor of the cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Morgan held that plaintiff's "recovery for wrongful retaliatory
discharge is contingent upon a finding that he was an employee ...."183
In Morgan, the purported employee claimed that he was wrongfully
79. Id. On appeal plaintiff attempted to rely on certain provisions of the Illinois Wage Payment
and Collection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39m-14 (1983), to support his "policy" theory. The
court refused to consider the argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal.
80. Palmateer,85 Ill.
2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
81. Midgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 143, 150, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (1984) (emphasis added).
82. For a list of Illinois retaliatory discharge cases in which an employee is the plaintiff, see
Palmateer,85 Ill.
2d 124, 130-32, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1984).
83. 479 N.E.2d 1336, 1338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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discharged in retaliation for filing a lawsuit against defendant wherein he
sought payment for services performed. At trial, the court had instructed the jury, erroneously, that, "under Indiana law it is a violation
of the State's public policy to discharge an employee or terminate an
independent contractor relationship in retaliation for the filing of a lawsuit by the employee or independent contractor over a wage or payment
dispute."'8 4 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, noting that
If [plaintiff] was an independent contractor, his relationship with
[defendant] was entirely governed by the contracts which allowed termination by either party after ten days notice without cause or immediately with cause. Only if [plaintiff] was an employee would the
employment at will doctrine and its exception for the exercise85of statutory rights protect him from discharge for filing the lawsuit.
It should be noted that the Morgan court applied the rule announced by
the Indiana Supreme Court in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. (an
employee at-will may not be discharged solely for exercising a right
granted by statute).8 6 It was the reasoning in Frampton that the Illinois
Supreme Court found persuasive in crafting the tort of retaliatory
87
discharge.
E. Retaliatory Dischargeand the Implied Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In seeking remedies for an allegedly wrongful discharge, plaintiffs
have often attempted to mix the tort of retaliatory discharge with the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 88 sometimes in the same
count. 89 Reliance on these alternative doctrines has not always proved to
be successful.
In Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., apparently the leading case
holding that in the context of an employment-at-will, the implied obligation to deal in good faith is not an independent basis for an action, a
federal district court noted that despite Kelsay and Palmateer, "Illinois
courts have shown no disposition to abandon the at will doctrine except
84. Id. at 1337 (quoting trial court's instructions).
85. Id. at 1338 (footnote omitted). Cf Dixon v. Burman, 593 F. Supp. 6, 11, 12 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (former insurance agent was an independent contractor not an employee, and thus his action
against insurance company for wrongful discharge was not within purview of Title VII), affid
memb., 742 F.2d (7th Cir. 1984).
86. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
87. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il. 2d 172, 182-83, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (1978).
88. See, e.g., Powers v. Delnor Hospital, 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 481 N.E.2d 968 (2d Dist. 1985);
Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069 (2d Dist. 1982).
89. See, e.g., Criscione v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (lst Dist.
1978). Note, however, that Criscione pre-dated Kelsay's enunciation of the tort of retaliatory
discharge.
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in carefully defined areas." 90 In Gordon, plaintiff, who worked as a law
book sales representative for defendant, was told that upon reduction of
his territory he would be terminated if he failed to achieve the same sales
goals set for his previous, larger territory. He did not meet the goals and
was subsequently fired.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant "maliciously manipulated circumstances to make [his] job impossible [and that t]his bad faith conduct...
is actionable." 9 1 In count I, plaintiff claimed to sue under both tort and
contract theories for defendant's breach of its duty and covenant, implied
in law, to deal with him in good faith. The court noted that the employment contract at issue was terminable at will by either party at any time.
Rather than creating an independent cause of action, however, the principle of performance in good faith only defines and modifies duties which
grow out of specific contract terms and obligations-it is a derivative
principle. 92 In this regard, the court found persuasive language in a New
York decision. While holding that New York law recognizes that an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing may be implied in a contract, the
New York court stated:
In such instances the implied obligation is in aid and furtherance of
other terms of the agreement of the parties. No obligation can be implied, however, which would be inconsistent with other terms of the
contractual relationship. Thus, in the case now before us, plaintiff's
employment was at will, a relationship in which the law accords the
employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time.
In the context of such an employment it would be incongruous to say
that an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to
a provision which would be destructive of his right of termination.
The parties may by express agreement limit or restrict the employer's
right of discharge, but to imply such a limitation from 93the existence of
an unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent.
The court also found support for its conclusion, that in at-will employment situations the duty to deal in good faith is appended to nothing
94
which has independent life, in Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co.
Martin held that the principle of good faith and fair dealing is essentially
used as a construction aid in determining the parties intent. In Martin,
the court dismissed a tort action based on an alleged termination of an
employment at will. The court stated that it did "not believe Illinois law
recognized a tort remedy based on an employer's 'bad faith' breach of an
90. 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
91. Id. at 1288.
92. Id. at 1289.
93. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983)).
94. 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1st Dist. 1982).
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implied contract of fair dealing," absent circumstances triggering a Kelsay/Palmateerexception.9" Further, the court cautioned against judicial
approval of plaintiff's argument:
Care must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of
contract into an independent tort action through the bootstrapping of
the general contract principle of good faith and fair dealing. We conclude that existing principles of tort law are adequate without our creating a new action based on a vague notion of fair dealing. A general
'bad faith' tort based on breach of contract would undoubtedly be difficult to apply in most cases and superfluous96in cases such as the present
one, which primarily sounds in contract.
There appears to be no backtracking from the clear position espoused by Gordon and Martin. For instance, in Powers v. Delnor Hospital97 the court, citing Gordon approvingly, noted that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing which the law implies in every contract9 8 does not
create an independent cause of action. And in Zewde v. Elgin Community College, the court observed that "Illinois courts have consistently
ruled that the parties to an employment at-will contract may terminate it
for a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all." 99 Finally, in Scott v.
Sears Roebuck and Co., the court rejected a terminated plaintiff's claim
that Illinois law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing that
limits the circumstances under which defendants can fire employees:
"That is not the law in Illinois."' ° Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs
have tried to expand the tort of retaliatory discharge to encompass an
additional duty of good faith and fair dealing or to create an additional
remedy, those efforts have not been successful.

95. Id. at 606, 440 N.E.2d at 1006.
96. Id.
97. 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 481 N.E.2d 968 (2d Dist. 1985).
98. See Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 111 I11. App. 3d 261, 268, 443 N.E.2d 1069, 1071
(2d Dist. 1982).
99. 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1250 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citing Cuerton, Ill I11.App. 3d 261, 263, 443
N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Dist. 1982); Criscione, 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669-70, 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1st
Dist. 1978)). See also Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., No. 85 C 6598 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1985).
100. 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See also Dykstra v. Crestwood Bank, 117 II1.
App. 3d 821, 826, 454 N.E.2d 51, 55 (1st Dist. 1983); Cuerton, 11 111. App. 3d at 263, 443 N.E.2d at
1073; Criscione, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 669-70, 384 N.E.2d at 95. Cf Payne v. AHFI/Netherlands, B.V.,
522 F. Supp. 18, 23 (N.D. I11. 1980) (quoting Criscione, supra, in which the court stated:
[R]equiring an employer in an at will relationship to terminate an employee only for a
legitimate business reason absent any other restrictions by contract or statute would place
the courts in the untenable position of having to assess an employer's business judgment.
There has been no attempt by the legislature to so alter the State's employment policy and
such a step is not one for the courts to make. The rule in this state is that an employment
at will relationship can be terminated for "a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all."
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CONCLUSION

In the seven years since Kelsay's enunciation of the tort of retaliatory discharge, Illinois courts have defined and redefined the tort's parameters. Not unexpectedly, given the relative youth of the remedy in
Illinois, the decisions often seem to lack consistency. What is clear, however, is that the tort of retaliatory discharge is now firmly ensconced in
Illinois. It is available to both at-will employees and those covered by
collective bargaining agreements who have been discharged for certain
activities in such a manner so as to contravene public policy. It is the
discovery vel non of "public policy" which remains the fulcrum of many
recent decisions. This article has reviewed these recent Illinois decisions
in an attempt to find a common ground. Although the commonality is
questionable, it is hoped that by outlining the boundaries of the various
decisions, this article has served to color in the map which represents
current views of the tort. As recent decisions make clear, the tort is
neither as "amorphous" as one commentator has suggested, 0 1 nor as
susceptible of such varied interpretations as Hamlet's cloud:
Hamlet:
Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in the shape of a
camel?
Polonius: By the mass and 'tis like a camel indeed.
Hamlet:
Me thinks 'tis like a weasel.
Polonius: It is backed like a weasel.
Hamlet:
Or like a whale?
Polonius: Very like a whale.102*
101. Comment, The Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at- Will Rule: Illinois Creates
an Amorphous Tort: Palmateerv. InternationalHarvesterCo., 59 CHI. KENT L. REV. 247 (1982).
102. W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene ii, line 369 et seq. (1604).
* While this article was in the process of being printed, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a
significant decision with respect to federal preemption of retaliatory discharge claims. In Koehler v.
Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., No. 60233 (Ill. Dec. 20, 1985), the court held that the Railway
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982) preempts an action for retaliatory discharge brought by an
employee covered by the Act. The effect of this holding on post-Midgett decisions should be interesting as Midgett expressly did not consider the issue of federal preemption and, indeed, granted plaintiff's motion to strike certain portions of the brief raising issues of federal preemption as they were
not earlier raised and therefore waived. Note also that the Seventh Circuit recently held that while
dispute resolution procedures differ somewhat from those under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), the Railway Labor Act has no more preemptive effect than the NLRA. Lancaster v.
Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 773 F.2d 807, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1985). Similarly, courts have held
that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempt certain state law
claims. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985) (bad faith handling of an insurance claim); Gibson v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., No. 85-1815 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 1986) (fraud);
Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (tortious termination of employment); Malone v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, 613 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (wrongful discharge);
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (retaliatory discharge); Beaird v. Miller's Mutual Insurance Ass'n of Illinois, 133 Ill. App.3d 670, 479 N.E.2d 374
(5th Dist. 1985) (reialiatory discharge).
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